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FIGHTING GENDER AND SEXUAL
ORIENTATION HARASSMENT
Martha Davis*
Thanks very much. This is an exciting conference, and
definitely an interesting time to be a civil rights lawyer - so I'm
glad to have an opportunity here to think bigger thoughts than are
the bread and butter of everyday practice.
The topic of this panel is harassment, but in my office - and
this is true of most women's rights advocates - we view harassment
on a continuum of violence against women. Of course, we've
known since the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor,' if not
before, that Title VII encompasses not just verbal harassment but
also sexual assault and other workplace violence initiated "because
of sex."2
We also know that verbal harassment and threats can serve the
same purpose as physical violence - and that laws protecting
women from violence will be ineffective if they are limited to
actual assaults and battering. For example, the federal Family
Violence Option3 of the welfare law provides relief from time
limits and work requirements for welfare applicants experiencing
threats that might preclude them from working, as well as for those
who are getting physically beaten up when they attempt to gain
independence.
Power and control can be manifest in coercion and threats,
intimidation, using blame, using children, imposing isolation, and
using emotional abuse - none of which involve physical violence.
So despite the explicit focus of this panel on "harassment," I
will concentrate on the "violence" end of this continuum.
* Martha Davis is the Legal Director at the National Organization for
Women Legal Defense and Education Fund.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000). See also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-69.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (2000).
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The 1990s saw a number of conceptual breakthroughs in the
understanding of the role of violence in women's lives - and,
significantly, their translation into public policy. Two important
legal developments were the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA") 4 and the Family Violence Option5 of the welfare
reform law. The 1994 Violence Against Women Act's civil rights
remedy defines violence against women as a civil rights issue -
and views states' failure to adequately respond to such violence as
a denial of equal protection that supports Congressional action to
provide alternative remedies.6 Recent news from Pennsylvania
provides a good illustration of why the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy is necessary. According to the Philadelphia Inquirer, until
a few months ago the Philadelphia police routinely coded sexual
assault cases in such a way that investigators would know to steer
clear of them, allowing those charges to languish until any potential
evidence was long gone.7 The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, which
provides a civil remedy against individual perpetrators of gender-
motivated violence, was also grounded in Congress' understanding
of the impact of violence against women on the national economy.
VAWA's redefinition of violence against women as a civil
rights violation also redefines this as an issue of public concern -
not something personal and private that should be left to the
individuals to deal with, but an issue important to women's
participation in civil society. However, the VAWA civil rights
remedy's impact is ultimately limited - while the initiation of a
case is controlled by the victim rather than the state, VAWA claims
can only be leveled against individuals, not institutions. This
exclusive focus on individual perpetrators means that, as a practical
matter, many plaintiffs will not choose to pursue these cases
against defendants who are not deep pockets.
' Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (Sept.
13, 1994).
' 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (2000).
6 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
' Mark Fazlollah et al., Review of City Sex Cases Sought, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Oct. 19, 1999, at Al; Mark Fazlollah et al., How Police Use a New
Code When Sex Cases Are 'Unclear,' PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 18, 1999,
at Al.
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The other legal breakthrough in the 1990s that I mentioned
earlier - Family Violence Option - also redefines violence against
women as a public policy concern, but takes a different tack by
putting legal responsibility for addressing domestic violence (very
broadly defined) on an institution - the welfare system. The Family
Violence Option for the first time explicitly recognizes the role that
violence plays in perpetuating women's poverty, and takes a first
step toward addressing that issue by requiring that - in states
taking the option - welfare recipients be screened for domestic
violence, referred to services and given flexibility if violence
prevents them from complying with welfare requirements like time
limits. 8 We are currently exploring the question of whether, when
a state takes the option, it creates an entitlement for welfare
recipients.
As recognition that violence against women is an issue of
public concern continues to grow, the challenge for lawyers in the
new millennium will be to make these public policies on the books
real and available to women - and to begin using law to change
the culture that promotes violence against women. I am going to
address the second issue - changing the culture - and argue that by
focusing on an institution - the welfare system - and according
legal responsibility to that system for addressing the public policy
problem of violence against women, the Family Violence Option
provides a model for going forward.
There are other, very good, models that demonstrate the way
that institutional change - encouraged by legal liability - can
promote social change. In the area of sex harassment law, We have
seen how effective the threat of litigation has been in convincing
businesses and government employers that workplaces must be
non-discriminatory. Indeed, the Faragher9 and Ellerth° cases of
the Supreme Court's 1998-99 term, spelled out specific require-
ments for employers - including maintenance of effective anti-
harassment policies and swift responses to harassers - that have
been (or should have been) adopted by every responsible employer
8 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A).
9 Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
10 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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in the country.11 This is a huge change from even a few years
ago. I believe that over the next few years, these changes will
make a tremendous difference in workplace culture - ultimately
leading to fewer lawsuits, and greater likelihood that the inevitable
issues that arise when people work together will be resolved
without federal litigation.
And these Title VII developments have clear legal implications
for other institutions and systems. For example, there has been little
sexual harassment litigation under Title VIII, the Fair Housing
Act,12 though the provisions barring sex discrimination in housing
are comparable to those under Title VII. Sexual harassment in
housing is typically manifest when a superintendent offers to
forego evicting a low income woman if she will sleep with him, or
a neighbor constantly engages in verbal harassment. This area of
harassment law may be the next major frontier.
So what are the institutions that need to be held accountable in
order to change the culture that accepts violence against women?
Expanded employer and school responsibility has proven to be
effective in the sexual harassment area. Those same techniques
should apply in dealing with violence - which is after all, part of
the same continuum that uses power and control to keep women in
their place.
Now, I should address the White Elephant in the room - the
fact that the VAWA Civil Rights remedy has been challenged as
unconstitutional by two individual defendants and their counsel, the
'1 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (discussing an employer's "affirmative
obligation to prevent [Title VII] violations" by taking the necessary steps to
prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as informing employees of their
right to raise and how to raise harassment claims, and by establishing complaint
procedures that encourage victims to come forward without requiring them to
first confront the offending supervisor); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (noting that an
employer can avoid liability if it can demonstrate that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,
and that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise); see also Tara Kaesebier, Note, Employer Liability in Supervisor
Sexual Harassment Cases: The Supreme Court Finally Speaks, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
203 (Spring 1999).
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2000).
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Center for Individual Rights. 13 At issue is whether Congress
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause and Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which permits Congress to enforce
the equal protection clause.' 4 Though some recent federalism
cases suggest that the result is a foregone conclusion - and the
press typically followed this line in reporting on the argument - I'm
not so sure that the civil rights remedy will be struck down.
Compared with other acts recently reviewed by the Court, it is
quite narrowly tailored and is also based on a voluminous,
extensive Congressional record demonstrating the economic impact
of gender-based violence. 5
If it is struck down, it becomes that much clearer that we
should take an approach more closely modeled on Title VII. Two
aspects of that approach are immediately apparent: expanding Title
VII's coverage of violence against women; and developing new
laws expanding employers' responsibility for addressing the
workplace impacts of violence against women.
First, looking at Title VII - while Meritor assumes that sexual
assault is "because of sex," it is less clear what circumstances are
necessary to give rise to Title VII liability for other types of
violence against women. Two recent cases have raised this issue.
13 "The Center for Individual Rights is a nonprofit public interest law firm
dedicated to the defense of individual liberties." Center for Individual Rights,
Mission Statement, at http://www.cir-usa.org/mission.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2001).
14 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (holding that the
Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with the authority to enact the civil
remedy provision of VAWA inasmuch as the provision was not regulation of
activity that substantially affected interstate commerce, and the enforcement
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide Congress with the authority
to enact the provision).
15 First, the Court attacked the substance of the findings, stating that
although Congress made findings regarding impact of gender-motivated violence
on victims and families, such findings were based on unworkable but-for
reasoning. Id. at 1752. Next, the Court attacked the effect of Congressional
findings, asserting that while Congressional findings may enable the Supreme
Court to evaluate the legislative judgment, the conclusions that the legislative
branch makes from these findings are ultimately subordinate to the conclusions
of the judicial branch. Id. at 1753 n.7.
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In Smith v. Sheahan,1 6 decided by the Seventh Circuit last fall,
Valeria Smith and Ronald Gamble were both guards at the Cook
County Jail in Chicago. Gamble was generally unpleasant to female
colleagues and violently assaulted Smith while at work, pinning her
against a wall and twisting her wrists until he damaged her
ligaments. This was not a sexual assault, though Gamble did call
Smith and other female officers "bitch," and made sexual com-
ments to one of the other female guards. The court concluded that
Gamble's violence, apparently directed exclusively at women, was
enough to sustain a claim under Title VII. While the "gendered
epithets" might also convince a jury that Gamble's hostility was
"because of sex," they were not necessary to the result. According-
ly, the Sheriffs office was held responsible for failing to adequate-
ly prevent or remedy the harassment. 7
A brief dissent argued that this was a case of battery.' 8 But
Sheahan is really a classic case of sex discrimination - differential
treatment based on sex. The fact that the treatment dispensed was
violence, as opposed to bonuses or demotions, made no difference.
Smith had the advantage of working in a workplace with many
women who had experienced the same treatment from Gamble - so
the differential nature of the treatment was easily demonstrated. But
NOW LDEF just settled a case in the Federal District Court of
Oregon, Valdez v. Truss Components,'9 brought on behalf of a
lone domestic violence victim who was threatened at her place of
work by her former partner, also an employee at the same
workplace. The employer, Truss Components, fired the woman -
which gave rise to a sex discrimination claim under Title VII. But,
had the case not settled, Maureen Valdez also planned to argue that
16 189 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1999).
17 Id. at 535 (holding that genuine issues of material fact as to whether
Valeria Smith was subject to sex-based harassment in violation of Title VII, and
whether the sheriffs department was negligent in failing to prevent or remedy the
harassment, precluded summary judgment in favor of department).
18 Id. at 536 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
'9 See Holly Danks, Defendant Settles Federal Lawsuit over Actions in
Workplace, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 30, 2000, at 1; Businesses Aid Violence
Victims: Companies Add Up How Much Abuse Costs Them, Offers Help to
Employees Who Need It, AUGUST CHRONICLE (Augusta, Ga.), Apr. 8, 2000, at
C9.
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the batterer's behavior created a hostile work environment, and that
the domestic violence that she experienced at the hands of her
partner/co-worker was "because of sex." Because of the settlement,
the Court never reached the issue of what would have to be proved
to make the case that this domestic violence, or any domestic
violence, met the Title VII standard - particularly in a small
workplace setting where no other women experienced the same
treatment as Valdez.
Clearly, there is work to be done under Title VII to clarify
these issues - and an opportunity to provide protection to work-
place violence victims under current law. The critical legal issue -
one that also arises under VAWA (and even under political asylum
law) - is whether domestic violence is inherently "because of sex."
But there is another way in which institutional responsibility
should be expanded - to mandate attention to workplace impact of
violence against women.
In debating the Violence Against Women Act, Congress
compiled an exhaustive record of the economic impacts of violence
against women. Many of those impacts occur in the workplace, as
abusers stalked their victims or harassed them by phone. Sexual
assault victims are also affected - fifty percent of rape victims lose
their jobs in the year after the crime. 20 Domestic violence victims
often experience absenteeism or lost productivity as a result of the
violence.
Because employment is a lifeline that keeps women in a
financial position to leave the abuse, it is particularly important
from a public policy standpoint to ensure that employers do what
they can to assist women in keeping their jobs. One model, already
pending in both Houses of Congress, is the Victims Employment
Rights Act,21 an extension of Title VII that bars discrimination by
employers against victims of domestic and sexual violence, and
gives a cause of action if the employer discriminates. Such
discrimination has in the past involved firing women when abusers
harass them in the workplace, and refusing to accommodate women
who need time to handle orders of protection or require flexible
20 Violence Against Women Act of 1993, S. REP. No. 103-138 (1993).
21 S. 1069, 106th Cong. §§ 2021-2026 (1999).
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hours to frustrate stalkers. A similar provision - called Intro 40022
- is pending before the New York City Council.23 Though civil
rights attorneys often tend to think of federal law as the appropriate
focus of their work, in the wake of recent federalism cases, such
state and local civil rights laws are particularly critical.
I want to close with a few words about the current climate for
civil rights work. As I mentioned earlier, the United States v.
Morrison defendants are represented by the Center for Individual
Rights. Amicus briefs in the case were filed by an array of
conservative legal groups, including the Eagle Forum,24 the
Independent Women's Forum 25 and the Pacific Legal Founda-
22 NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 8-107.1 (2001) (prohibiting
employers from discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation and other terms of
employment because of a person's status or perceived status as a victim of
domestic violence or stalking).
23 On December 19, 2000, the New York City Council voted to amend Title
8 of the Administrative Code of New York City to add the new section 8-107.1.
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 8-107.1 (2001). On January 5,2001,
after initial opposition, New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani signed the measure.
Thomas J. Lueck, Giuliani Acts to Shield Jobs of the Abused, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
6, 2001, at B4.
24 Brief of Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum, United States v. Morrison, 120 S.
Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29). The Eagle Forum is a conservative women's
organization founded by Phyllis Schlafly, and considers its mission "to enable
conservative and pro-family men and women to participate in the process of self-
government and public policy making." Eagle Forum, Join Eagle Forum and
Phyllis Schlafly Be Where the Action Is, at http:\\www.eagleforum.org (last
visited Mar. 12, 2001).
25 Brief of Amicus Curiae Independent Women's Forum, United States v.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29). The Independent Women's
Forum ("IWF") is a nonprofit organization based in Arlington, Virginia,
dedicated to research and public education on policy issues concerning women.
The IWF challenges the use of gender-based studies in legal and judicial decision
making, and seeks to "[aiffirm the family as the foundation of society."
Independent Women's Forum, Mission Statement, at http://www.iwf.org/about/-
mission.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2001).
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tion.26 Civil rights lawyers today face a well-organized opposition
virtually every time they go to court, or go to the legislature.
Today, I've mapped out a long term affirmative strategy for
expanding women's ability to participate in society as equals and
changing the culture that accepts violence against women by first,
continuing to integrate violence against women into the public
policy debate rather than treating it as a private matter; and second,
focusing on holding institutions accountable for failing to address
violence, by broadening the analysis of "because of sex" to include
more forms of violence against women under Title VII and Title
VIII, and enacting new legislation directed at protecting victims of
violence from discrimination in the workplace.
But in the current climate for civil rights law and civil rights
lawyers, we also need a defensive strategy. While I don't have time
to map out that strategy today, let me just underscore that we need
to be working on both fronts just to preserve the status quo.
Further, these groups on the right have acknowledged their
indebtedness to civil rights groups, whose litigation and public
education tactics they have liberally copied. I think now, it is time
for us to borrow some tactics from the right. One of their most
effective strategies has been to use the Federalist Society as a
mechanism for shaping legal thought and developing a unified
approach. And it strikes me that, not only is that what this
conference is about from the civil rights and civil liberties
perspective, but wouldn't it be wonderful if it sowed the seeds for
a more comprehensive and effective response to the current assault
on civil rights in the courts and by the courts.
26 Brief of Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation, United States v.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29). The Pacific Legal
Foundation ("PLF") is a nonprofit legal foundation that supports "less govern-
ment and the preservation of free enterprise, private property rights and
individual liberties." Pacific Legal Foundation, at http://www.pacificlegal.org
(last visited Mar. 10, 2001).
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THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT IN
GAY RIGHTS CASES
Nan D. Hunter*
INTRODUCTION
The argument that laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation in fact discriminate on the basis of sex is not new.
Advocates have been pressing this claim for almost thirty years.
Simply put, the argument is that a statute that bars a sexual
relationship between two women or two men discriminates on the
basis of sex because either partner could have had the same
relationship with a person of the opposite sex.
The beginning was not auspicious for the sex discrimination
argument. Courts considering challenges in the 1970s to marriage
laws concluded, with very little need for discussion, that marriage
was definitionally an institution involving only male-female
couples, and that therefore even a state Equal Rights Amendment
could not undo the prohibition on same-sex marriage.' Similarly,
courts hearing employment discrimination cases easily concluded
that sex discrimination meant discrimination against women or
occasionally against men, but not anti-gay discrimination.2
That easy dismissal of the sex discrimination argument has
begun to erode. The first judicial adoption of this argument came
in 1993 in Baehr v. Lewin, in which the Hawaii Supreme Court
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Chris Fowler for his
assistance with research and editing.
' See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974). Accord Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
2 See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979);
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
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held that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples did constitute
a prima facie case of violating that state's Equal Rights Amend-
ment.3 In 1999, it was taken up and expanded by Justice Johnson
as part of the basis for her concurrence in Baker v. Vermont,
holding that the Vermont marriage statute violated that state's
constitution.4 Most recently, the Texas Court of Appeals invalidat-
ed a same-sex sodomy statute on that ground as well.'
The sex discrimination argument has also begun to gain traction
in sexual orientation cases arising under statutes. The Supreme
Court has ruled that same-sex harassment claims are justiciable
under Title VII,6 in response to same-sex sexual harassment
complainants who have sought to frame the allegedly unlawful
conduct as sex discrimination, either rather than or in addition to
sexual orientation discrimination.7 Similarly, under Title IX, same-
sex harassment has been recognized as a subset of sex discrimina-
tion.8 For example, the Wisconsin state anti-discrimination statute
' 852 P.2d 44, 81-82 (Haw.), recons. granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.
1993).
4 744 A.2d 864, 898 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring).
' Lawrence v. Texas, No. 14-99-00109-CR, 2000 WL 729417 (Tex. App.,
June 8, 2000).
6 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); see also
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143-44 (4th Cir. 1996)
(allowing a Title VII claim to proceed where the male plaintiff alleged
discrimination by his allegedly homosexual supervisor not because of the
plaintiffs heterosexual orientation, but because he was male).
7 See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v.
New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999); Doe v.
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of
Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and
Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989).
8 See Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn.
2000); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal.
2000); see also Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School
Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12036 (Mar.
13, 1997) ("The Guidance has been clarified to indicate that if harassment is
based on conduct of a sexual nature, it may be sexual harassment prohibited by
Title IX even if the harasser and the harassed are the same sex or the victim of
harassment is gay or lesbian."). In Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir.
1996), the court found that a school district discriminated on the basis of sex in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause when it failed to protect a gay student
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includes sexual orientation within its definition of sex discrimina-
tion,9 and an Oregon court interpreted that state's law against sex
discrimination to encompass a challenge to the denial of health
insurance benefits to the partners of lesbian and gay state employ-
ees.' o One court outside the United States has invalidated a sexual
orientation classification on the ground that it constituted sex
discrimination under an international covenant." But beyond the
principle that one can state a prima facie claim in such cases, there
is no clarity as to what relationship exists between sex equality law
and sexual orientation claims
It is time to pay more attention to this cluster of arguments.
Other writers have explored the advantages and disadvantages of
the sex discrimination argument for the goal of advancing lesbian
and gay rights law.12 Instead, I would like to try to fill what I see
as an unfortunate gap in the analysis. Scholars whose primary field
is women's rights have generally ignored the possible repercussions
from harassment. Schools, the court announced, "are required to give male and
female students equivalent levels of protection." Id. at 456.
9 WIs. STAT. § 111.36(1)(d)(1) (1997 & Supp. 2000).
10 Tanner v. Oregon Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. App. 1998).
" Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/-
50/D/488/1992 (1994), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/-
vws488.htm. The Human Rights Committee, an international body created under
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), held that the Tasmanian Criminal Code provisions outlawing private
consensual contacts between adult homosexual men was a violation of the
ICCPR, as a violation of privacy and the ICCPR's equal protection mandate,
because the laws discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. But see
Case C-249/96, Grant v. Southwest Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS
6505 (1998) (rejecting the sex discrimination argument on the ground that the
limitation of certain benefits to married persons treated men and women equally).
See generally Robert Wintemute, Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex
Discrimination: Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes, 60 MOD.
L. REV. 334 (1997).
12 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and
Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Samuel A.
Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1 (1992); Francisco Valdes,
Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"
"Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
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for sex discrimination law of using that claim in sexual orientation
cases, with the prominent exception of Sylvia Law, who wrote the
first major article on the topic. 3 I want to initiate discussion of
the possible reverberations for feminist law, as well as for lesbian,
gay, bisexual and transgender ("LGBT") rights law.
I am going to discuss these cases in terms of the leading
paradigms of sex discrimination law. Because I want to focus on
constitutional concepts of equality, my most frequent example will
be marriage law, where the argument has been most fully devel-
oped. I am not going to address claims arising under anti-discrimi-
nation statutes, such as the harassment cases.
My beginning point will be the two primary conceptualizations
of sex discrimination: formal equality theory and anti-subordination
theory. 14 Both of these theoretical approaches have been invoked
in the scholarship concerning the use of sex discrimination
arguments in LGBT cases, and either is sufficient to sustain a
finding that sex discrimination exists. In turn, such rulings in
LGBT rights cases are likely to have a significant impact on
understandings of how law operates to subordinate women.
Ultimately, though, I am going to argue that neither approach
is culturally sufficient to meet the objections of those who assert
that the sex discrimination argument is a doctrinal sleight of hand
when used to challenge sexual orientation discrimination. To fully
answer those objections, one must address the issues that arise in
the context of what I will call definition theory. Definition theory
is the most provocative of the approaches to these overlapping
areas. Because of its provocative nature, definition theory is the
least useful in litigation, but also the most powerful in its potential
cultural impact.
"3 Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 187 (1988).
" See Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861
(1997). For simplicity's sake, I am combining two of Abrams' categories -
difference theory and dominance theory - into anti-subordination theory.
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I. FORMAL EQUALITY THEORY
Formal equality is considered the old, boring version of civil
rights law. Critics have attacked it for its superficiality and
formalism; 5 and despite its usefulness in removing explicit legal
barriers for women, it is rarely described positively in feminist
scholarship.' 6 In fact, claims of sex discrimination in gay rights
cases may be the only realm in which formal equality theory still
has any real intellectual kick.
For an analysis of using sex discrimination arguments in gay
rights cases, the starting point for formal equality claims is Loving
v. Virginia, 7 the case which held that anti-miscegenation laws
were unconstitutional. In Loving, the Court ruled that laws
prohibiting intermarriage violated the Equal Protection Clause
because they were based on a racial classification. This, the Court
said, was per se impermissible - absent a compelling state interest
- even if the law operated to bar certain acts both for whites and
for persons of color.
In gay marriage cases, courts adopting a formal equality
analysis substitute the word "sex" for the word "race" in a critical
passage from Loving, so that, rewritten, it becomes:
"5 See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 955 (1984); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75
CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1987).
16 For a rare endorsement, see Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the
Law Condemns": Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect
Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1447 (2000) (proposing that formal equality, or
anti-differentiation, is an attractive principle, even though it is less fashionable
today than the alternate anti-subordination principle, because formal equality does
not lead to the separate-but-equal thinking that results from applying the anti-
subordination principle, as evidenced by Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring
opinion in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 565 (1996)). A similar
disjuncture between equality theories that are successful in litigation and those
most favored by scholars occurs in LGBT cases between arguments grounded in
more individualist notions of rights and those proceeding from a group rights
approach. Nancy Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness: Beyond Formal Equality
and Antisubordination Strategies in Gay Legal Theory, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 867,
870 (2000).
17 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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[W]e reject the notion that the mere 'equal application' of
a statute containing [sex] classifications is enough to
remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's proscriptions of all invidious discrimination. . . . In
the case at bar, ... we deal with statutes containing [sex]
classifications, and the fact of equal application does not
immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of
justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has tradi-
tionally required of state statutes drawn according to
[sex]. 18
Thus by analogy, Loving stands for the proposition that but for the
partner's sex, the individual could marry her or him. The same
move leads to a similar conclusion as the discriminatory impact of
criminal laws that prohibit sodomy only between same sex
partners: "the distinction between legal and illegal conduct [is] not
the act, but rather the sex of one of the participants."19 On this
understanding, the sex-based classification per se is the equality
violation.
This theory of equality formed the basis for the Hawaii
Supreme Court's ruling that the marriage law amounted to
discrimination based on sex"° and for the invalidation of the Texas
state sodomy law by the Texas Court of Appeals. 2' Yet there have
always been two problems lurking in the heart of formal equality
doctrine about sex. They both manifest themselves in the sexual
orientation cases generally and the marriage cases specifically.
The first major problem for formal equality doctrine arises if
the two groups in question are not considered similarly situated.
For men and women, the argument has always been that commen-
surability is lacking because of biological difference. In the early
1970s, faced with the argument that "natural" differences justified
a wide range of barriers to women, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then
head of the ACLU Women's Rights Project, flipped the meaning of
18 Id. at 8.
'9 Lawrence v. Texas, No. 14-99-00109-CR, 2000 WL 729417, *3 (Tex.
App., June 8, 2000).
20 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 81-82 (Haw.), recons. granted in part, 875
P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
2 Lawrence, 2000 WL 729417, at *4.
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biology in her arguments to the Court in Reed v. Reed22 and
Frontiero v. Richardson.23 She argued that the immutability of the
sex characteristic and the individual's lack of control over it made
using it to justify inferior treatment all the more invidious and
unfair.24 Ginsburg "had effectively taken what had previously
been the greatest weakness of equal protection arguments against
sex-based classifications and made it the center of the case. 25
Ginsburg's move was a masterful litigation stroke, but it also
left unchallenged - indeed, it strengthened - the link between
sexual difference and biology. Her argument forced the Court to
examine more closely the legal barriers to individual women who
sought the opportunity to disprove a generalization based on their
female status, but left open the continued reliance on biological
norms in cases involving sex and reproduction, arenas where
seemingly no woman could escape the "rule" of nature, at least as
the courts interpreted that rule.26
22 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
23 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
24 See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, at 5, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No.
70-430). Ginsburg began her appeal with an argument that sex, like race,
deserved "suspect classification" status because sex and race shared many of the
same characteristics:
Although the legislature may distinguish between individuals on the
basis of their need or ability, it is presumptively impermissible to
distinguish on the basis of an unalterable identifying trait over which
the individual has no control and for which he or she should not be
disadvantaged by the law. Legislative discrimination grounded on sex,
for purposes unrelated to any biological difference between the sexes,
ranks with legislative discrimination based on race, another congenital,
unalterable trait of birth, and merits no greater judicial deference.
Id.
25 Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA. L. REv. 1375,
1453 (1999).
26 See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469
(1981) (holding that as long as the rule of nature that the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances is realistically reflected in a gender classifica-
tion, the statute will be upheld as constitutional; here, a California statutory rape
law was found constitutional because the gender classification realistically
reflected that females bear all of the risk of pregnancy); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 494-95 (1974) (holding that the rule of nature that women, unlike men,
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The manipulability'of biology-based arguments is evident in the
opposite uses, depending on outcome, to which they can be put. In
women's rights cases, courts have justified different treatment based
on a finding of "real" difference, most often involving pregnancy.
In the gay marriage cases, courts have justified different treatment
because of the absence of biological difference, on the theory that
the institution of marriage requires difference.27 In other words,
the biological difference between sexes has been invoked to create
an exemption from the equality mandate in pregnancy cases and a
prerequisite for it in gay marriage cases.
Judicial reliance on (what judges perceive as) biology reflects
and reinscribes a deep naturalization of gender. Thus, when courts
like the Hawaii Supreme Court reject the argument that marriage
is necessarily only male-female, they are undermining the kind of
essentialism that has been most harmful to women. Even simple
formal equality claims in gay marriage cases can provide a
powerful lift out of some of the essentialist boxes used to hold
back women, because they interrogate deeply embedded notions of
gender.
One can see the dynamics of the naturalization of gender in the
text of now Justice Ginsburg's opinion in the VMI case:
are susceptible to the risk of disability resulting from normal pregnancy does not
require a state disability insurance program to cover this condition because the
Equal Protection Clause does not require a state to choose between attacking
every risk of disability versus not attacking disability problems at all); see also
Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985). The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act established protection for pregnant women in the
realm of employment, but not, for example, in family law or criminal law. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). Thus, Geduldig is still good law as an interpretation
of the Constitution. Even the Pregnancy Discrimination Act has not always
proven reliable in eliminating differential treatment of pregnant women. See, e.g.,
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987). But see Int'l
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
The Court's most recent engagement with the constitutionality of a
pregnancy-linked classification ended inconclusively, when the Court found no
standing for the party challenging an immigration law that treated children born
to unmarried parents differently depending on whether the father or mother was
a U.S. citizen. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
27 See, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69 (Bums, J., concurring).
404
GAY RIGHTS CASES
Supposed 'inherent differences' are no longer accepted as
a ground for race or national origin classification [citing
Loving]... Physical differences between men and women,
however, are enduring... 'Inherent differences' between
men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain
cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an
individual's opportunity.28
The text of this passage moves from "inherent differences" as a
discredited basis for certain classifications, to "physical differences"
between the sexes, and back to "inherent differences., 29 Are the
two terms synonymous? Is this a sly way to exclude psychological
differences from the final phrase, which was largely the basis for
VMI's argument that women were naturally unfit to be cadets at a
co-education facility?30 Exactly which differences are we to
celebrate? Is this a euphemism for heterosexuality? For female
bonding? Doesn't the last sentence incorporate two contradictory
principles: that these inherent differences, as contrasted to racial
ones, are proper grounds for classification - but not for "artificial"
constraints on an individual?
Indeed, the Loving analogy helps to obscure that contradiction,
since it is based on an analogy to race, the realm where indisput-
ably there is no place for a separate but equal doctrine. The Court's
decision in Loving signaled that the repudiation of separate but
equal, which the court began in Brown v. Board of Education,3'
was complete. That consensus has not formed as to gender, as to
which there is still substantial support for separate institutions. For
gender, unlike race, the cultural orthodoxy is difference. What
28 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
29 Id.
30 See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1432-35 (W.D. Va.
1991) (listing in detail the evidence presented by VMI during trial, arguing that
the "Gender-Based Physiological Differences" and the "Gender-Based Develop-
mental Differences" between male and female students were appropriate reasons
for limiting VMI to an all-male educational facility); see also Amy H. Nemko,
Single-Sex Public Education After VMI: The Case for Women's Schools, 21
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 44-45 (1998).
3' 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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would be the philosophy comparable to race - gender blindness -
is not widely accepted in the culture.
Gender is most naturalized in the realm of sexuality. Same-sex
marriage cuts to the heart of that naturalization in a very powerful
and visible way.12 Recognition of same-sex marriage would call
into question the law in women's rights cases, which have turned
on an acceptance of the inevitability of sex roles in sex. Often such
cases have permitted the differential treatment of pregnancy, or of
women because of the possibility of pregnancy. 33 Although
heterosexual couples can reject sex roles in sex, the plausibility that
such rejection occurs is more socially visible when same-sex
couples are involved. Nonetheless, the potential is that acceptance
of same-sex marriage would strengthen the consciousness in cases
involving heterosexual women that such roles are not inevitable
and ordained by nature.
II. ANTI-SUBORDINATION THEORY
The second problem with the formal equality model is that it
ignores power. Discrimination against men really is not the same
evil as discrimination against women, and one would say the same
as to "reverse discrimination" against whites, for example. In both
examples, the core of the problem is not the absence of abstract
equality but the presence of subordinating systems of power.34
Anti-subordination theory speaks to this: sex discrimination not
only classifies, it subordinates a class.
This concept of dominance has been the focus of almost all of
the scholarship and almost none of the judicial decisions in the gay
rights cases where plaintiffs have asserted a sex discrimination
32 1 developed this argument in Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender:
A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9 (1991).
33 See supra note 26 (discussing pregnancy in the sex discrimination
context).
34 See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986) (arguing that, compared to the anti-
differentiation perspective, anti-subordination better explains much of the equal
protection doctrine's history and case law, as well as the aversion felt toward race
and sex discrimination).
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claim. First Sylvia Law35 and then Andrew Koppelman 36 articu-
lated the argument that anti-gay discrimination subordinates women
by its reinforcement of gender normative stereotypes about proper
male and female behavior. Koppelman's article specifically
answered the argument that reliance on the surface level analogy
to Loving is insufficient because the Court there did not rely simply
on the law's creation of a racial distinction; it held that the
distinction did not in fact apply equally to all races, but was framed
to enforce a code of white supremacist preservation of a "superior"
race.37 Koppelman argued that a similar enforcement of male
supremacy lay behind the prohibition of homosexuality.38 No
judge has taken up that argument as part of the analysis of a gay
rights case, but Justice Johnson's opinion in Baker v. Vermont
provides a suggestive first step. 9
The standard example in a formal equality approach of how the
sex discrimination argument operates is that a court imagines two
persons of the same sex; let us call them Thelma and Louise.
Either can marry a man, but neither can marry the other. Because
neither wants to marry a man and they are barred from marrying
each other, they suffer discrimination based on the sex of their
partner.4 °
Justice Johnson used a version of this standard story, but one
which can be read to illustrate a subtle but significant shift in the
narrative. As Justice Johnson framed the example, Dr. A and Dr.
B both want to marry Ms. C. Dr. A is male; Dr. B is female. "The
statute disqualifies Dr. B from marriage solely on the basis of her
35 Law, supra note 13.
36 Koppelman, supra note 12; see also, J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of
Status, 106 YALE L. J. 2313, 2361-64 (1997).
3' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); see also Koppelman, supra
note 12, at 222-26.
38 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 234-57.
3' Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 898 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concur-
ring).
4 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND.
L.J. 1, 18 (1994) (discussing how the courts have viewed bans on same-sex
marriage as sexual orientation discrimination, and not sex discrimination).
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sex and treats her differently from Dr. A, a man. This is sex
discrimination.'
What is slightly different about this framing is that there is a
third person in the imaginary construct, Ms. C, who is presumably
choosing between Dr. A and Dr. B. This scenario has a different
resonance than the more familiar story of two women who are
simply excluded from the institution of marriage. In my reading of
Justice Johnson's version, the social force of law is not simply to
exclude based on sexual orientation or to penalize Dr. B., but to
produce heterosexuality. One imagines that Ms. C could go either
way. If she wants to marry, however, she must choose Dr. A.
Implicit in the example is that the harm is in the social coercion of
Ms. C and in the forcible imposition of heteronormativity.42
Justice Johnson sees the limitation to opposite-sex marriage as
a vestige of the "sex-role stereotyping" that pervaded marriage law
prior to feminist legal reforms, citing enforced economic dependen-
cy and the treatment of married women as legal incompetents as
examples.43 Again, one can see the point as not merely discrimi-
natory treatment, but the role of the law of marriage as a major
engine of coercion for almost all women. Under an anti-subordina-
tion theory as well as a formal equality theory, one can trace a
clear link between how classifications based on sex have produced
social regulation of women as well as of non-heterosexuals.
To some extent, this link appears self-evident in everyday life.
We all know that eliminating discriminatory laws opens up new
4" Baker, 744 A.2d at 906.
42 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 800
(1989).
13 Baker, 744 A.2d at 908 (Johnson, J., concurring). Justice Johnson offered
numerous examples of a woman's dependence on her husband:
Under the common law, husband and wife were one person. The legal
existence of a woman was suspended by marriage; she merged with
her husband and held no separate rights to enter into a contract or
execute a deed. She could not sue without her husband's consent or be
sued without joining her husband as a defendant. Moreover, if a
woman did not hold property for her "sole and separate use" prior to
marriage, the husband received a freehold interest in all her property,
entitling him to all the rents and profits from the property.
Id. (citations omitted).
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life possibilities and creates subtle shifts in perception. Changes in
the popular language of marriage mark that evolution: from the
traditional terms of "husband and wife" - or even, "man and wife"
- that once were universal; to the now common gender neutral
word, "spouses;" to the increasingly widespread use of the term
that originated with lesbian and gay couples, "partners."
Nonetheless, there is much resistance to the full elaboration of
the gender discrimination argument. If anti-gay discrimination is so
harmful to women, for example, one might ask why more women's
rights organizations have not been highlighting this argument. All
of the feminist organizations support a right to gay marriage, and
many have played supportive roles in the litigation.' But one has
no sense that anyone, including them, feels like this is their
argument. Granted, any claim is more radical when it touches
homosexuality, but many sex discrimination cases involve gender
normative stereotypes. Is there a reason beyond political hesitancy
that this argument has so much difficulty acquiring traction on the
ground?
To many people, including many feminists, the sex discrimina-
tion argument in gay rights cases seems too clever by half. For
some, that is because it seems to be a dodge around what they
sense is really going on, which is the subordination of homosexual-
ity.45 For many married women, it apparently is highly implausi-
ble to believe that legalizing same-sex marriage will have any
impact on opposite-sex marriage. Among my straight women
students, for example, most support gay marriage out of a sense of
solidarity with another oppressed group. To their credit, it is a
4 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae National Organization for Women Legal
Defense and Education Fund, National Center for Lesbian Rights and Equal
Rights Advocates, Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
4' This is the argument made from the opposite policy perspective by the
dissenting judge in Lawrence. Lawrence v. Texas, No. 14-99-00109-CR, 2000
WL 729417, *5 (Tex. App., June 8, 2000) (Hudson, J., dissenting). "Although
[complainants] have attempted to frame their challenge ... in terms of gender
discrimination, their true ground for complaint is that the statute criminalizes
certain homosexual conduct that, in a heterosexual setting, would be perfectly
legal." Id. at 7.
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purely altruistic position. They appear to have no sense that it will
do anything for them.
Critics argue that the exclusion of same-sex couples from
marriage does not harm women as a class, but gay people as a
class. Bill Eskridge points out that the same argument could have
been made for anti-miscegenation laws.46 Those laws had a direct
effect only on the mixed-race couples who wanted to marry, not on
all African-Americans. Furtherance of the white supremacist
ideology that the laws embodied was an indirect effect. Eskridge
ultimately returns to the Koppelman thesis, arguing that dominance
theory works if the subordination is indirect as well as direct. 7
Edward Stein has responded to Eskridge and others, asserting
that the sex discrimination argument is sociologically, theoretically
and morally mistaken. 48 Stein asserts that relying on a sex dis-
crimination theory in a gay marriage case is to ignore the primary
basis for the discrimination: homophobia. He analogizes it to a sex
discrimination challenge to anti-miscegenation laws, which could
be premised on the understanding that "a significant purpose of
such laws was to protect white women from black men," but which
would misidentify the disadvantaged class (by asserting that it was
women) and the belief system underlying the law (by focusing on
sexism rather than racism). 49
There is, however, a crucial distinction between using a sex
discrimination argument in the anti-miscegenation cases and using
one in the gay marriage cases. The statute at issue in Loving
explicitly discriminated based on race. Although I would agree with
Stein that sex and race are deeply interconnected in U. S. culture,
the law on its face did not draw a sex-based distinction. It could
have; a legislature could have chosen to specify differential
penalties when an inter-racial marriage involved black men and
46 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
THE CLOSET 220-21 (1999).
41 Id. at 221.
48 Edward Stein, Sexual Orientation and the Law: A Critique of Two
Arguments for Lesbian and Gay Rights, in HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 43-53 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., forthcoming
2001) (copy on file with the Journal of Law and Policy).
49 Id. at 43.
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white women, for example. Although that might have been the
deepest fear of white legislators, they did not incorporate that
distinction into those statutes.
In the gay marriage cases, on the other hand, the explicit
classification drawn by the statutes is one of sex. Although the
arguments used to justify the statutes might be homophobic, the
legislators have not chosen to classify based on sexual orientation.
The unlikelihood that they will - the improbability of states
adopting laws that prohibit homosexual persons from marrying -
speaks to the deeply imbricated nature of sex and sexual orienta-
tion. Legislators may well understand their actions as penalizing
homosexuals rather than women, and especially as penalizing open
homosexuality, but the fact that what seems the most direct and
obvious mechanism for doing so is a distinction based on sex
rather than sexual orientation illustrates how this situation is
different from that of Stein's hypothetical sex discrimination
challenge to anti-miscegenation laws.
It is also worth pointing out that, however favored by progres-
sive scholars, anti-subordination theory is not the law. The anti-
subordination language of Loving was dicta;5" the reliance on
color-blindness and formal neutrality in constitutional jurisprudence
has increased, not decreased, since that decision.5' If courts were
to assert the inadequacy of anti-subordination reasoning as a
doctrinal bar to sex discrimination claims in gay marriage cases,
that rationale would reek of intellectual dishonesty.
Most significant for women as a class, rather than LGBT
people as a class, is the function of sex-based distinctions to
produce and enforce norms that privilege masculinity. Although
50 The Court held that use of an explicit racial classification was sufficient
to find the law unconstitutional. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 10-11.
"' See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,"
44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991) (detailing the modem Court's progression from the
explicit recognition of racial differences in cases like Brown v. Board of
Education, where the Court endorsed the distinction to right a prior wrong; to the
modem Court's more explicit attempts to adopt a purely race-neutral approach,
rejecting any law relying on any types of racial classifications, even those
establishing corrective elements, such as affirmative action).
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such norms may also constrain some men, what matters for
purposes of this analysis is that they constrain all women.
III. DEFINITION THEORY
Gender-linked stereotypes about sexuality are not just about
behavior. They are about what people perceive as definition, and
that definition turns on the naturalness and the thoroughness of
male-female difference. Thus there is some truth to the trope of the
early gay marriage cases that the claim could not succeed because
of the very definition of marriage. The use of sex discrimination
arguments in these gay rights cases profoundly challenges the
definition of gender, and will inevitably resonate in women's rights
cases.
I think that there are two logics possible for answering the
definition argument directly. The first, which I reject, is to argue
that heterosexual sexual behavior itself is intrinsically determined
by gender roles. Sexuality is a knowledge/power system that is
gendered and through which gender flows, but I do not believe that
sexual practices are a simple function of gender. The social
organization and understanding of sexual practices cannot be
reduced to a function of gender.52
The other logical response, which I embrace, is what I will call
definition theory. It is precisely the act of defining male and
female, masculinity and femininity, which inscribes gender.5 3
Koppelman discussed the function of gender polarities in perpetuat-
ing a dominance system, noting that polarities enable hierarchy.54
Definition theory takes that point deeper. It is in the process of
definition that the difference is constructed.
52 See Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics
of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267-
319 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984).
" See, e.g., ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL
THEORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND MEN passim (1989) (studies from biology);
THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO
FREUD passim (1992) (studies from history); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 6-7 (1990) (cultural studies).
14 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 202, 234-38.
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Katherine Franke has most fully developed this idea as it
applies to the operations of law." Franke argues that the process
of definition, "[t]he authority to define particular categories or
types of people and to decide to which category a particular person
belongs," is a social practice that reflects dominant power struc-
tures, not self-evident facts of nature.56 In the realm of sex
distinctions, she examines a series of cases that turn on an
"ideology of sexual difference," 57 despite apparently contradictory
facts.58 Her conclusion is that "[b]iology is both a wrong and
51 See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law:
The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1995).
56 Id. at 3.
57 Id.
" Franke describes a number of seemingly inconsistent rulings, including the
following:
In Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83 (1970), an English court was asked to
determine whether or not April Ashley was a woman at the time of her marriage
to Arthur Corbett, a man. Born a man, but having undergone a successful sex-
reassignment surgery, Ms. Ashley had 'remarkably good' female genitals," had
female hormonal levels, and "passed easily as a woman." Franke, supra note 55,
at 45. Yet, at all times, she had male chromosomes; thus, the court determined,
"an individual's sex is permanently fixed at birth and cannot be later changed.
.. " Franke, supra note 55, at 46. In deciding that Ms. Ashley was, at the time
of the marriage, "a man," the court noted plainly: "these submissions, in effect,
confuse sex with gender. Marriage is a relationship which depends on sex and
not on gender." Franke, supra note 55, at 47.
In City of Columbus v. Zanders, 266 N.E.2d 602 (Ohio Mun. 1970), in the
context of criminal sumptuary laws, a Columbus, Ohio, court convicted a pre-
operative male to female transgendered person who was arrested three times for
dressing as a woman. Zanders was fulfilling part of his pre-operative therapy.
The court upheld the conviction, although noting that the sumptuary laws
operated to reinforce gender norms, on the ground that the law prevented the
cross-dresser from perpetrating a fraud on the general public. Franke, supra note
55, at 66. A year later, however, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down the same
statute for lack of a scienter requirement. City of Columbus v. Rogers, 324
N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1975); Franke, supra note 55, at 68. The removal of the law
permitted a biological male such as Zanders to appear publicly as a woman.
And in Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994), the court was
asked to allow the plaintiff, a woman, access to the Citadel, an exclusively male
military college. The court considered that there were "some real differences
between men and women," and thus there were some legitimate reasons for
accommodating those differences. Id. at 563. The court focused, however, not on
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dangerous place to ground antidiscrimination law because it fails
to account for the manner in which every sexual biological fact is
meaningful only within a gendered frame of reference."'5 9
Janet Halley has made a comparable point about the definition
of sexual orientation and the roles of law in constructing and
enforcing homo- or heterosexuality. 60 Halley points out that the
legal definition of homosexuality changes depending on context; as
one moves from sodomy law discourse to adoption laws to military
regulations, the same individual might be first defined into, then
out of, the category of homosexual.6' In some instances (but not
others), the disjuncture between gender role behavior and anatomi-
62cal sex is determinative. 2 In the gay marriage cases, those
constitutive forces of law - the construction of sex and of sexual
orientation - converge.
I will admit that the phrase "definition theory" is provocative,
perhaps unnecessarily so. Either of the other approaches is
doctrinally sufficient to sustain a sex discrimination claim, and this
is the most controversial framing of a justification. I use it to
intentionally invoke what opponents of gay marriage have relied on
as their primary argument, the assertion that the very definition of
any "real" differences - meaning biological or even gender-based. Rather, the
court focused on the need for privacy in public restrooms. Franke's response:
"Yet there are no significant differences in male and female anatomy that require
separate and distinct sanitary facilities. Although privacy may be an important
cultural value, it is not a 'real difference' of the kind courts demand when it
requires that separate facilities be justified by real and demonstrative differenc-
es." Franke, supra note 55, at 82. Ultimately, however, the court held for the
plaintiff, and Shannon Faulkner entered the Citadel. Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. at
569.
59 Franke, supra note 55, at 98.
60 Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Toward Equal Protection for
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 948-56 (1989); Janet
E. Halley, The Construction of Heterosexuality, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET:
QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 82-102 (Michael Warner ed., 1993).
6' Halley, The Politics of the Closet, supra note 59, at 948-56.
62 See Patricia Klein Lerner, Jailer Learns Gay Culture to Foil Straight
Inmates' Crime, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1990, at B1 (describing the process of
segregating gay inmates in a men's prison in Los Angeles to protect them from
the general prison population, and guarantee them the same rights and privileges
of other prisoners).
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marriage requires an opposite-sex couple. The point is not whether
marriage has always been understood to be defined that way,63 or
even that the definition relies on an impermissible classification, as
"voter" once was defined as white or male. The more fundamental
claim is that current marriage law actively creates and enforces
gender hierarchy by constructing the social meaning of male-female
difference.64 Although Franke does not invoke marriage as an
example of her theory, in many respects it is the prime example of
''an ideology of sexual difference."
An argument that marriage can exist without sexual difference
implies that gender polarity is not essential for a (perhaps the)
primary social unit. Such dispensability indicates that gender's
perceived salience and importance have been more the product of
social structures and processes than of biology or nature. That
notion can be simultaneously discomforting and liberatory for
women (as well as for men).
Perhaps in part as a result of the ambivalence among women,
a curious divergence is developing between judicial reasoning and
social perception in the LGBT cases decided on sex discrimination
grounds. Despite holdings based on a finding of sex discrimination,
the rulings are accepted (to the extent that they are) and described
in popular media as being about "gay rights." The problem with
this development is not only that the courts duck a confrontation
with the anti-gay animus which is at work, as discussed supra, but
the potential liberatory impact of such rulings is sharply truncated.
The primary challenge, therefore, may be to feminist rights
advocates: to claim the full meaning of such rulings and to
interpret them socially, as well as legally, as victories for women.
CONCLUSION
As long as there is no federal statutory protection65 or height-
63 For a strong argument that this belief is incorrect, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 15-44 (1996).
64 See Hunter, supra note 32.
65 See Steven A. Holmes, Civil Rights Dance Lesson: The Tiny Step
Forward, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at D5 (reporting on a Senate vote resulting
in the defeat of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would have
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ened constitutional scrutiny for sexual orientation claims,66
lawyers will continue to press the sex discrimination argument in
LGBT cases. Whether conceptualized as formal equality, anti-
subordination or definition theory arguments, sex discrimination
claims in LGBT rights cases will have major ramifications for
"traditional" sex discrimination claims brought by women to
challenge policies preferring men. Here, necessity is the mother of
re-invention. And the possibility of re-inventing our understanding
of what sex discrimination means is both a risk and an opportunity
for women's rights advocates.
provided federal employment protections for lesbians and gay men).
66 See Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45
(1996); see also Kyle C. Velte, Paths to Protection: A Comparison of Federal
Protection Based on Disability and Sexual Orientation, 6 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 323 (2000).
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Vicki Schultz*
I am delighted to be here with such a distinguished and
wonderful group of people to celebrate the thirty-fifth anniversary
of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review. It is a
great opportunity for all of us to talk to each other about what has
been happening in the field of sex harassment law.
I do not think it is fair to say, as some people have suggested,
that the fundamental rethinking of harassment law that is going on
right now is a backlash against women, or feminists.1 There are
many feminists and gay rights activists and queer theorists of good
will who are going back to square one to figure out whether
harassment law is doing the work it should be doing.2 I am such
* Professor, Yale Law School; Evelyn Green Davis Fellow, Bunting
Fellowship Program, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, 2000-2001. 1 would
like to thank the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review for inviting me
to appear on this panel, which was chaired brilliantly by Professor Janet Halley.
I would also like to thank my fabulous research assistant Jamie Kohen for her
able assistance with sources.
l Catharine A. MacKinnon, Harassment Law Under Siege, N.Y.TIMES, Mar.
5, 1998, at A29 ("The insidious argument that sexual harassment law turns 'all
sex into harassment' epitomizes the current backlash."). Cf. Tamar Lewin, Debate
Centers on Definition of Harassment, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 22, 1998, at Al
(describing the so-called "Seinfeld" case, see infra note 45, as an apparent case
of backlash against sexual harassment law); Kate Zernike, A New Sexual
Harassment Dynamic, BOSTON GLOBE, May 18, 1998, at Al (describing the
current backlash of men filing harassment claims).
2 See DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN 190-96 (1995) (criticiz-
ing earlier theories of harassment for protecting "good girls" from sexual
advances, rather than placing all women in charge of their own sexual desire);
Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1169, 1205-12 (1998) (criticizing earlier theories of harassment for negating
women's sexual agency); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual
Harassment? 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 729-62 (1997) (criticizing earlier theories
of harassment for neglecting same-sex sexual harassment).
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a person.3 I have come to believe that we need to fundamentally
change the way we think about harassment. In my view, we need
to move away from the model that has prevailed over the last
twenty years. In an earlier work I have referred to this model as the
sexual desire-dominance model,4 but today I am going to call it
the sexual model for short.
Under the sexual model, the quintessential case of harassment
involves a powerful, typically older male boss who makes unwant-
ed sexual advances toward a less powerful female subordinate. The
Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas controversy, the Tailhook incident, the
Stroh's Brewery lawsuit, the Paula Jones case - in fact, almost all
of the harassment cases that have been publicized widely in the
news media - conform to this sexual model.5 I have come to
believe that this is a fundamentally misguided way to think about
sex harassment. It has taken me a great deal of time and effort to
come to this position, and I have only a few minutes today to talk
to you about why.
One problem with the sexual model is that it is top-down;
indeed, the entire conception of dominance and subordination that
is used in some of the literature is top-down.6 Top-down models
3 In both the scholarly and popular literature, I have developed a fundamen-
tal critique of one version of sex harassment law. See generally Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L. J. 1683 (1998) [hereinafter
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment]; Vicki Schultz, Sex Is the Least
of It: Let's Focus Harassment Law on Work, Not Sex, THE NATION, 19 Vol. 266,
May 25, 1998, at 11; see also Ellen Yarosnefsky, More Than Sex: Why the
Courts Are Missing the Point; An Interview with Vicki Schultz, MS. MAGAZINE,
May 1998, at 56-61.
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1692-711.
5 For a description of how Hill-Thomas, Tailhook, and the Stroh's cases
conformed to the sexual paradigm, see Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, supra note 3, at nn. 19-45 and accompanying text; see also Jones v.
Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996), aff'd, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681
(1997).
6 See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 137 (1989) (arguing that "sexuality is the dynamic of control by which
male dominance - in forms that range from intimate to institutional, from a look
to a rape - eroticizes and thus defines man and woman, gender identity and
sexual pleasure" and that sexuality is "that which maintains and defines male
supremacy as a political system"). Cf Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above
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assume that power follows from formal roles and that it flows from
those who occupy higher positions down onto those who occupy
lower positions. Yet power is not always contained in formal
structures, and it can circulate in many unexpected directions. In
the workplace, many women (and men) experience horizontal
harassment that involves exclusion by peers, not simply vertical
harassment that involves coercion from bosses. Indeed, the day-to-
day interactions through which co-workers create relationships that
mark some people as insiders and other people as outsiders are a
crucial part of the dynamic that sustains sex segregation and
hierarchy in the workplace. Harassment is not always about who is
on top and who is on bottom; it is also about who is "in" and who
is "out."
I want to move our legal and cultural understanding of sex
harassment toward a model that places exclusion from work, rather
than abuse of sexuality, at the forefront. The sexual model treats
harassment as a way for men to use work to appropriate sex from
women. But we can also see harassment as a way for men (or
women) to use sex to appropriate work for themselves. Some men
resort to sexual assault, along with other behaviors that intimidate
and exclude women, as a way to claim the best jobs as masculine
terrain.
Work is one of the most important distributional goods that
exists in our society; it provides the foundation for citizenship,
economic security, community, and self-esteem.7 Indeed, work is
central to most people's sense of themselves,8 including their sense
All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (proposing
a framework for evaluating sex discrimination based on eradicating the
subordination of women to men).
' I discuss these issues in more detail in a recent essay. See Vicki Schultz,
Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000). For references to the literature
documenting the significance of work, see id. at 1886-92, 1908-10, 1930-3 1; see
also William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1, 19-21, 90 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of work to equal citizenship);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 530-33 (1997) (describing the importance of work to
personal identity, community, and equal citizenship).
8 For a more thorough elaboration of this point, see Schultz, Life's Work,
supra note 7, at 1890-91.
419
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
of themselves as men or women. So, it should not surprise us that
some men will try to monopolize good jobs to safeguard their
economic superiority and to secure their manly identities. Male
workers can define their jobs as the domain of those who are
suitably "masculine," for example, by driving away the women and
even men who do not fit the projected masculine image, or by
marking those who remain as different and inferior.
Once we make this shift away from the sexual model toward a
work-centered model, we can see many issues through a different
lens. Take, for example, the issue of sex segregation and harass-
ment among school children. I once wrote an article in which I
argued that occupational segregation by sex - or, the sex-type of
the work people do as adults - cannot be attributed to sexism in
early childhood socialization. 9 The standard explanation for
occupational segregation is that people are raised to prefer jobs that
are coded as "feminine" or "masculine" - girls want to be nurses,
boys want to be doctors - and they just follow in that trajectory
when they grow up. I hope I persuaded some readers that this
explanation fails: most people end up doing jobs that have very
little to do with what they thought they would do when they were
children, and the sex-type of the jobs to which they aspire as
children does not predict the sex-type of the jobs they hold as
adults. I still insist that I was right about that point.
But I do think I failed to appreciate how early in life the
process of shaping gender identity by claiming certain activities as
"masculine" (or "feminine") begins. I now have a four-year-old,
and I have spent a lot of time in preschools and on playgrounds. I
have seen first-hand how some groups of children try to claim
certain play activities and playspaces as gendered, in the same way
that some adults try to claim lines of work and workplaces as
gendered. For example, at my daughter's preschool, when the
teachers created a fantasy play structure that was a construction
site, a group of the older boys claimed the site as a "boys"' space
9 Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising
the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1798-839 (1990)
(arguing that early childhood socialization toward femininity and masculinity
cannot explain the sex segregation of employment among adults).
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and coded construction as a "boys"' activity. Whenever the girls
entered the site, these boys warned them away or ostracized them
by hitting them, pressing their toy power tools against them, calling
them "stupid," and refusing to play with them. Before long, even
the girls who loved to play with construction toys at home
internalized the message that, at school, construction was not for
them. Although I have been amazed (and dismayed) to observe this
process occur among young children, in hindsight I suppose it was
predictable. Play serves the same functions for children that work
serves for most adults. Through play, children explore their world,
bond with others, obtain social recognition, express their creative
energies, and develop their sense of themselves. So, just as work
is one of the main activities through which people create their
senses of themselves as (certain kinds of) "men" and "women," so,
too, play is a central medium through which children begin to
define themselves as (certain kinds of) "boys" (in this case, "bad
boys") and "girls." Through this process, the psychological and
institutional habits of exclusion begin. Once we see children's
interactions from this perspective, it seems clear that we should be
more concerned with these non-sexual, exclusionary patterns of
behavior than with some of the comparatively benign, sexually
themed incidents that have captured the attention of the schools and
the national news media.1°
We should focus our energy on the same sorts of patterns of
gender-based exclusion among adults in our nation's workplaces.
This is one of my major critiques of the sexual model: it has led
courts and commentators to focus obsessively on sexual conduct,
while deflecting our attention away from arguably more common,
non-sexual forms of gender-based hostility and abuse that women
(and many men) endure every day in workplaces all over the
country. For my Yale Law Journal piece, I read hundreds and
hundreds of harassment cases - almost every lower federal court
sex harassment hostile environment case that was decided between
'0 See, e.g., Cynthia Gomey, Teaching Johnny the Appropriate Way to Flirt,
N.Y. TIMEs MAG., June 13, 1999, at 43 (describing an incident in which a
schoolboy shapes a milk bag into a replica of a penis). Gomey also describes an
incident in which a North Carolina school suspended a six-year-old boy for
kissing a girl classmate on the cheek. Id. at 45.
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the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Meritor" and its 1993
decision in Harris,12 as well as a large random sample of cases
decided thereafter.13 Over and over again, I kept seeing the same
pattern: when women entered fields that had been defined tradition-
ally as "men's work," some of the men became very threatened by
the women's presence.14 These men did all sorts of things to drive
the women away or to mark them as less competent. The cases
involve everything from genuine assaults - such as shoving file
cabinets onto the women, pulling knives on them, or hitting,
kicking and groping them 5 - to everyday micro-aggressions -
such as excluding the women from social interactions and train-
ing,' 6 or picking on them constantly.'7 Work sabotage is incredi-
" Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (recognizing for the
first time that a sex-based hostile work environment constitutes a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII).
12 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
13 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1710
n. 127 (describing methodology).
"4 This pattern is well documented in my earlier article. See Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1721-32, 1758-62
(describing harassment cases that conform to this pattern and reviewing the
sociological and ethnographic literature that documents and explains this
phenomenon). Many cases decided after the article was published still conform
to this pattern. See, e.g., Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Intern, Inc., 227 F.3d
179 (4th Cir. 1999) (female automotive factory worker); Smith v. Sheahan, 189
F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1999) (female guard at jail); Williams v. General Motors
Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999) (female factory worker); Richmond-Hopes
v. City of Cleveland, 168 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 1998) (female electric meter service
installer); Durham Life Insurance Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999)
(female insurance salesperson).
"5 See, e.g., Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559 (M.D.
Fla. 1990), aff'd, 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991) (male technician held a knife
to plaintiffs throat, shoved her into a file cabinet, threatened to bang her head
into the ground, and grabbed her pelvic area and breasts); Kirkland v. Brinias,
741 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Tenn. 1989), affid, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991) (fifty-
year-old male busboy hit, kicked, and sexually groped the waitresses); see also
Kirstin Dowley Grimsley, A Hostile Workplace: Into an Abyss of Sex Harass-
ment At Eveleth Mine, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1996, at A01 (male miner slashed
a gash in female miner's pant leg, drawing blood; another pressed his body
against a female miner and then put his hands around her throat).
16 See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509,
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bly common.1 8 In some cases, men actually altered work machin-
ery in ways that threatened women's safety; one woman had a hole
drilled in her arm. 19 In less dramatic cases, men stole women's
case files,2° overburdened them with work, and engaged in more
mundane activities to create the impression that the women were
not doing their jobs well and did not belong there.2 ' In some
540-41 (3d Cir. 1993) (involving a law firm associate who claimed that she was
denied the opportunity to work on large complex cases and was subsequently
denied partnership on the ground that she lacked the capacity to handle such
matters); Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1543 (10th Cir. 1993) (involving a
construction technician who claimed that she was denied the opportunity to
obtain construction experience in the field); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798
F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1986) (involving an auto mechanic trainee who claimed
that she was denied the ability to learn to do brake repair and was subsequently
fired on the ground that she was not productive at such work).
17 See, e.g., Cross v. Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation,
49 F.3d 1490, 1497 (11th Cir. 1995) (psychiatric facility employees referred to
as "rather dumb," "stupid," or "just a woman"); Davis v. Boeing Helicopter Co.,
No. 88-0281, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11990, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1990)
(involving a female aircraft assembler who was promoted to electrician and who
claimed that her supervisor "harassed her and made it impossible for her to
complete her work by checking her progress every few minutes"); Turley v.
Union Carbide Corp., 618 F. Supp. 1438 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (foreman harassed
female employee by "picking on [her] all the time" and treating her differently
from the male employees).
"8 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1713-
28, 1734-38, 1748-55.
'9 See MARY MARTIN, HARD-HATrED WOMEN: STORIES OF STRUGGLE AND
SUCCESS IN THE TRADES 33-34 (1988) ("[The men] didn't want the women to
replace them, so they pulled stunts. Someone cut the chain holding up a big
motor mount I was welding. It fell down on me and burned my arm to the
bone."); id. at 257 ("I had to start checking all the parts on my machine because
Dick would loosen stuff on it, which could kill you.").
20 Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1473 (3d Cir. 1990)
(black female police officer contended her coworkers stole or hid her case files
in an attempt to harass her).
2 See, e.g., Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 910 (1st Cir.
1988) (reporting an allegation that a coworker "had falsified a medical record in
an attempt to create the impression that the plaintiff and [another employee] had
mishandled a case"); Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226, 233
(E.D.N.Y. 1983), affid, 755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985) (involving female
firefighters who were inadequately trained by officers who instead set out
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settings, of course, men resorted to sexual assaults and crude sexual
advances to threaten the women and undermine their perceived
professionalism. But in most cases, such sexual misconduct was
part of a larger pattern to exclude the women or to communicate
the message that they are different or inferior.
The sexual model has created another related problem. It
encourages people to think of harassment as a form of behavioral
misconduct in which individual bad actors engage, rather than as
a set of social relations that are embedded in a larger context of
structural inequality in the workplace. As a result, sex harassment
policies have become stand-alone policies that are completely
divorced from the larger policies designed to achieve gender
integration. I did some research a couple of years ago and inter-
viewed a number of managers and management consultants. Almost
all of them defined sex harassment primarily, if not exclusively, in
terms of sexual misconduct. They had adopted isolated policies and
procedures for dealing with sex harassment, rather than dealing
with it as an aspect of a broader anti-discrimination program.
Unfortunately, they did not see eradicating harassment as part of a
larger, more affirmative project of creating a company culture that
is gender-integrated and welcoming to both sexes. These findings
were surprising to me, because harassment is really just a type of
deliberately to undermine their physical capacity to do the job, and then
terminated them at the end of their probation period); Beeman v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 724 F. Supp. 674, 675 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (reporting an allegation by a
female grocery store manager that her boss harassed her by "making daily checks
upon her work, . . . belittling her performance, . . . reprimanding her in
meetings that lasted up to three hours .... making long lists of things for her to
do, ... [and] asking her to accomplish work tasks that were impossible to
accomplish within the allotted time"); Downum v. City of Wichita, 675 F. Supp.
1566, 1569-70 (D. Kan. 1986) (involving a female firefighter who claimed she
was rushed through training to be a dispatcher and made to do the job before she
was ready); Hosemann v. Technical Materials, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I.
1982) (plaintiffs coworkers sabotaged her work and "always... tried to make
her do her work poorly"); Accardi v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 292, 297
(Ct. App. 1993) (reporting a female police officer's allegation that her
department undercut her performance by "deliberately overburdening her with
double work assignments; denying assistance when she requested it; [and]
deliberately circumventing established procedures when she was assigned to duty
as a court officer in order to make her work more difficult").
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discrimination. The whole concept of hostile work environment
harassment emerged when judges realized that after many compa-
nies had ceased discriminating overtly, more covert barriers to
integration had emerged. Rather than managers refusing to hire
racial minorities or women, they could simply look the other way
while incumbent workers drove the newcomers away.22 Once we
understand that harassment is just a subtle type of discrimination
designed to maintain traditional patterns of segregation, it seems
clear that harassment policies should be integrated into more
comprehensive organizational policies to achieve desegregation.
Such policies must take into account the specific history and
culture of the firm, the professional field in question, and the
particular job setting.
Rather than facilitating such a fine-tuned sociological approach,
the sexual model lends itself to a free-floating, trans-contextual
analysis. Defining sex harassment as a form of sexual violation -
the "unwelcome sexual advance" - that transcends the particular
organizational context makes it possible to essentialize the concept
of harassment. Such an approach can translate readily into the
proposition that men's sexual advances inherently violate women's
dignity or equality. There is reason to be concerned that this is
happening around the globe, as some nations have imported the
sexual model of harassment that is now being questioned by
feminists in the United States, and incorporated it into their own
legal and cultural traditions.23 Following close on the heels of
legal developments in the United States, for example, the European
Union took steps to condemn and outlaw workplace sex harassment
as a violation of women's dignity, while defining harassment in
sexual terms strikingly similar to those promulgated by the United
States EEOC.24 Austria passed a law that adopts both the sexual
22 This pattern of management acquiescence in co-worker harassment is
described in Martin, supra note 19; Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment:
Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 37-38
(1990).
23 See Vicki Schultz, Sexual Harassment, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 7-8 (forthcoming 2001).
24 See Mia Cahill, The Legal Problem of Sexual Harassment and Its
International Diffusion: A Case of Austrian Sexual Harassment Law, 10-11
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substantive definition and the privatized enforcement mechanisms
of the American approach; 25 France criminalized what we would
think of as quid pro quo harassment.26 These legal approaches
failed to connect harassment to a larger system of workplace
gender inequality that relegates women to inferior jobs; they simply
accept the gender segregation of work as a "neutral" background
condition rather than defining it as the structural context in which
harassment flourishes (and which it fosters).
I encountered this same lack of understanding when I taught a
session on sexual harassment at a conference on global constitu-
tionalism a few years ago at Yale.27 Apart from the one U. S.
Supreme Court Justice who was present,z8 many high-level jurists
from around the world simply did not appear to comprehend what
I was saying about the link between sex segregation of employment
and hostile work environment harassment. They viewed sex
harassment exclusively as a form of sexual imposition (akin to
rape), and many of them used legal discourses that defined sexual
advances against a woman as a violation of her basic human
dignity. Now, it's not that I don't believe sexual advances can ever
infringe on interests we might think of as dignitarian in nature; of
course they can.29 But to legally equate sexual advances toward
women with inherent violations of women's dignity strikes me as
(2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Journal of Law and Policy)
(showing that the European Union definition of sexual harassment relied greatly
on the definition from the EEOC guidelines, especially the emphasis on conduct
of a sexual nature).
25 Id. at 14-15, 22-23.
26 See Abigail C. Saguy, Sexual Harassment in France and the United
States: Activists and Public Figures Defend Their Definitions, in COMPARING
POLITIES AND REPERTOIRES OF EVALUATION IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED
STATES 19 and n.34 (Michele Lamont & Laurent Thevenot, eds., 2000)
(manuscript forthcoming, on file with the Journal of Law and Policy) [hereinafter
Saguy, Sexual Harassment in France].
27 Conference on Global Constitutionalism, Equality: International Norms,
Session on Sexual Harassment, Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut,
1998.
28 Justice Stephen Breyer attended the conference, and he clearly understood
my point.
29 See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111
HARv. L. REv. 445 (1997).
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a reductionist, potentially dangerous move that feminists should
evaluate very carefully.
A related problem with harassment law's focus on sexual
misconduct is that it invites inquiry into the sexual history and
sexual self-presentation of the person who was harassed. In current
harassment doctrine, for example, the law asks whether the sexual
advances or conduct were "unwelcome." Now, under a work-based
model of the type that I am advocating, we would not need such
an unwelcomeness standard, because it would make no sense to ask
whether someone had welcomed being subjected to an environment
that interfered with their ability to pursue their work. "Did the
harassee welcome being driven out of her job?" "Did she welcome
being made to look incompetent?" These are not questions that
would be on our radar screen. But once we have a model that
focuses on sexual advances and other sexual activity, we do have
to have something like an unwelcomeness standard because we
don't want to prohibit all sexual activity.
Some sexual advances and other forms of sexual activity are
desired and invited, even in the workplace. Yet, once we have an
unwelcomeness standard, we know from past experience that courts
will abuse it and allow inquiry into whether the victim behaved in
such a way as to welcome her own harassment.3" In the hostile
work environment context, there are shocking cases, such as one
case in which the court deemed a woman to have "welcomed" such
actions as having her head pushed in the toilet, being shocked with
a cattle prod, being maced, and being hit and punched in the
kidneys - simply because she had had the temerity to use profanity,
tell off-color jokes, flirt, and go without a bra.31 There is a
30 See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 826-35 (1991).
31 See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the "unwelcomeness" requirement was not met where a female jailer claimed
that she was "handcuffed to the drunk tank and sally port doors, ... that she
had chairs pulled out from under her, a cattle prod with an electrical shock was
placed between her legs, and that ... [she was] handcuffed to the toilet and her
face pushed into the water, and maced," all on the ground that she had used
profanity, told off-color jokes, engaged in sexual horseplay and flirting, and
failed to wear a bra underneath her T-shirt); see also Weinsheimer v. Rockwell,
754 F. Supp. 1559, 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1990), affd, 949 F.2d 1162 (1 lth Cir. 1991)
(rejecting sexual harassment claim on the ground that the unwelcomeness
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problem when the victim has to meet an image of a Sunday school
teacher in order to win a harassment case.32 The law separates the
good girls from the bad girls, and punishes the latter.33
When the law has this sexual focus, it is not only women who
are harmed. The focus on rooting out unwelcome sexual advances
permits those who enforce the law to condemn not just bad girls,
but also other people whom our culture views as the walking
embodiments of dangerous or offensive sexuality. We can predict
who such people will be: women and men of color, working class
men and women, gay men and lesbians, bisexuals and transgen-
dered people, and other sexual minorities.34 The courts can deem
requirement was not met where plaintiff had engaged in sexual banter and joking
and had used "abusive and vulgar language" in speaking to her boyfriend on the
telephone at work).
32 I believe Anita Hill fell victim to this phenomenon. At first, her credibility
was high because she came across as a prim, school teacher type. Eventually,
however, "[h]er veracity, her motives, her private life, and even her sanity would
come under assault. It would require an intense effort, but Hill's apparently
pristine character would.., be completely transformed." JANE MAYER & JILL
ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS 280 (1994).
By the time the Senate hearings were over, "[s]he had been portrayed as, among
other things, a political zealot, a sexual fantasist, a scorned woman, possibly a
closet lesbian, and a pathological liar who had lifted bizarre details from The
Exorcist in a desperate effort to destroy Thomas." Id. at 305.
'3 I have analyzed this problem in greater depth elsewhere. See Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1744-45.
34 See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV.
1695 (1993) (documenting the role of homosexual identity in the state's
regulation of sexuality); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992) (arguing that the regulation of sexuality threatens
reinforcing or increasing the social penalty accruing to disfavored sexualities).
Cf Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-Supression,
72 TEx. L. REV. 1097, 1119-20 (1994) (noting that, in the context of pornogra-
phy regulation, "judges, jurors, and most members of the public are likely to find
most explicit or 'deviant' sexual depictions repellant and view as degrading not
only sexual portrayals that descriptively, humorously, playfully, or ironically
depict subordinated women, but also those that are explicitly intended to
challenge that subordination"); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The"
Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1145-47 (1993)
(stressing that censorship of pornography would likely be used against
homosexuals, feminists, and those perceived to have deviant sexuality, and
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such people outside the bounds of legal protection extended to
harassees - or, worse yet, stigmatize them as harassers.
A good example of this kind of targeting of a sexual minority
is the double standard courts have adopted with respect to gay men
(or those presumed to be gay) in sex harassment cases.35 The
courts have characterized male bosses who make sexual advances
toward men as harassers, on the ground that the boss would not
have been attracted to and therefore would not have made a similar
advance toward a woman. This reasoning, of course, presumes that
the bosses are homosexuals who have desire only for men, and
uses that presumption as the basis for finding them guilty of sex
harassment.36 By contrast, however, the courts have almost never
reporting allegations that Canadian customs censors have singled out gay and
lesbian, as well as radical, bookstores).
31 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 1777-
1785 (analyzing in detail this double standard); see also Kenji Yoshino, The
Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REv. 353 (2000)
[hereinafter Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract] (arguing that courts have set up
a two-tiered system of justice for homosexual and heterosexual harassers).
36 See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448
(6th Cir. 1997) ("When a male sexually propositions another male because of
sexual attraction, there can be little question that the behavior is a form of
harassment that occurs because the propositioned male is a male - that is,
'because of ... sex."'); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143
(4th Cir. 1996) ("We hold that a same-sex 'hostile work environment' sexual
harassment claim may lie under Title VII where a homosexual male (or female)
employer discriminates against an employee of the same sex or permits such
discrimination against an employee by homosexual employees of the same sex.");
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that same-sex sexual harassment claims could be actionable if and only
if the defendant is shown to be homosexual).
There is a more theoretical objection to this line of reasoning - indeed, to
the entire edifice of "but-for" reasoning that undergirds the cause of action for
quid pro quo harassment perpetrated by those presumed to be exclusively
heterosexual or homosexual. This "but-for" reasoning first emerged in early cases
involving heterosexual male supervisors who fired women who refused their
sexual advances. In these cases, the courts faced a dilemma: just what was it
about this situation that constituted discrimination "because of sex" within the
meaning of Title VII? Early courts held that the male supervisor's sexual
advance amounted to discrimination because of sex because the supervisor had
made an advance toward a woman that he would not have made toward a man.
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extended protection from sex harassment to gay men (or men who
are presumed gay), even when they are subjected to overt, gender-
based harassment at the hands of straight (or presumably straight)
men. 37 (I am talking about men here because most of the cases
with which I am familiar involve men. But I suspect that this
pattern would hold in cases involving women as well.)38
This problem of the normalization of some kinds of sexuality
at the expense of others39 raises the prospect that the conventional
sexual model of harassment law may tread too heavily on free
expression - especially the sexual expression of unpopular groups.
Of course, this is a complex subject about which people of good
See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Although it may not
be obvious at first blush, this reasoning actually identifies as the source of sex
discrimination the sexual attraction or desire presumed to underlay the
supervisor's sexual advance. For, according to the courts' logic, the only reason
the heterosexual supervisor made an advance toward the woman that he would
not have made toward a man is that the supervisor felt an attraction or desire for
her that he would not have felt for a man. The courts applied the same logic to
male supervisors who made advances toward men who worked for them,
reasoning that the supervisors (who they presumed were homosexual) would not
have felt desire for and therefore would not have made advances toward women
- only for men. This reasoning is objectionable on many levels. As my colleague
Kenji Yoshino has pointed out, it negates the possibility of bisexual desire. See
Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract, supra note 35. Even more fundamentally, one
might object, as I do, to the fact that it singles out sexual desire as the source of
legal prohibition - or, put colloquially, it outlaws desire.
" See, e.g., Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that harassment of a gay male employee by male co-workers and male
supervisor was not harassment "because of sex"); Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766, *15 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) (male worker harassed
by male co-workers who thought he wasn't "macho" enough); see also Doe by
Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997) (man accused of being
gay harassed by straight male co-workers); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp.
1452 (N.D. I11. 1988) (same). For analyses that question and complicate the
courts' presumptions about the sexual orientations/desires of harassers and even
the harassees, see Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract, supra note 35.
38 See, e.g., Johnson v. Cmty. Nursing Services, 985 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Utah
1997) (female supervisor made sexual advance toward female employee); Myers
v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (same).
'9 See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS,
AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999).
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will can disagree. But it is not only conservatives who should be
worrying about this issue;4" I believe feminists and liberals should
also be doing so.4" We should make sure that harassment law
does not give employers an incentive - or excuse - to fire ordinary
workers for engaging in benign sexual expression in the name of
protecting women.
Corporations have long had an incentive to suppress and control
sexuality in the workplace. With the emergence of Taylorism in the
early twentieth century, managers sought to sanitize their compa-
nies of emotionality and the other messy stuff of human life they
saw as interfering with the rational functioning of the firm:42
reproduction, birth, death, sickness, disease, love, and sexuality.4 3
0 For some insightful analyses of this problem by conservative commenta-
tors, see Kingsley Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991); Eugene
Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1791 (1992); Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work
Environment" Harassment Law Restrict? 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997).
41 For some good analyses by scholars with a feminist perspective, see J. M.
Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2295
(1999); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the
Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REv. 687 (1997).
42 Taylorism is a theory of management introduced by Frederick Winslow
Taylor, who introduced ideas of scientific precision into the world of worker
management. See John Fabian Witt, Note, The Transformation of Work and the
Law of Workplace Accidents, 107 YALE. L.J. 1467, 1488 (1998) ("Taylor
developed a series of new managerial techniques, including standardized and
minutely controlled processes of production and maintenance, and stopwatch
time-study to replace workers' informal know how with ostensibly scientific
rationality."); see also ROBERT KANIGEL, THE ONE BEST WAY: FREDERICK
WINSLOw TAYLOR AND THE ENIGMA OF EFFICIENCY (1997); ROSABETH MOSS
KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 20-22 (1977).
" There is evidence that the old bureaucratic paradigm is in the process of
being replaced. See Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 7, at 1919-28
(documenting the shift from the old bureaucratic workplace to newer, more fluid
forms of work organization); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological
Contract at 3 (Jan. 31, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Journal
of Law and Policy) (discussing the shift to a new employment regime character-
ized by less employment security and more emphasis on "general skills training,
upskilling of jobs, networking opportunities and contact with firm constituents
for employees at all levels of the firm, micro-level job control, market-based pay,
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This same reasoning persists today. As I have heard many people
put it, "Well, of course we should eliminate sexual harassment,
because when people are at work, they have no business fooling
around; they should be working."'  Sex harassment law may
provide an extra push for management to ban sexual interaction
across-the-board, without worrying about whether it is welcome or
unwelcome (even though the company would not be held liable for
conduct that was not unwelcome). This incentive may explain why
we are beginning to see policies that are disturbing from a gender-
equality perspective: policies prohibiting men and women from
traveling together on business, policies preventing male supervisors
from meeting with their female staff behind closed doors, and even
policies prohibiting dating or sexual joking among employees.45
We need a feminist approach to sex harassment that avoids
these pernicious effects and articulates an alternative normative
vision. Even if we could banish all hints of sexuality from the
workplace - the place where we spend most of our waking hours
- this would not represent progress. On the contrary, I think it is
part of a feminist vision of progress to be able to express ourselves
freely and to be more fully human while we are at work. Now, of
course, we all have to respect other people, and we need to get
along well enough to work together to achieve common goals. But
we should not allow some people to censor what their co-workers
say simply because they are offended. When people are being fired
for sexual harassment simply because they show a dictionary
and firm-specific dispute resolution institutions for ensuring fairness"). It remains
to be seen whether the new, more fluid forms of work organization will take a
different approach to matters of emotionality, sexuality, and the like.
' Sociologist Abigail Saguy has documented a strand of American feminist
thought that also emphasizes this same productivity-oriented rationale for
regulating sexual harassment. See Saguy, Sexual Harassment in France, supra
note 26 at 15-16.
45 Tamar Lewin, Debate Centers on Definition of Harassment, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1998, at Al (noting that some employers "have tried to de-sexualize the
workplace, adopting codes forbidding intra-office dating, touching or staring");
Kate Zernike, A New Sexual Harassment Dynamic, BOSTON GLOBE, May 18,
1998, at Al (noting that "companies have ruled out travel involving two
colleagues of the opposite sex" and many "have banned romantic relationships").
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46definition of the word "clitoris" to a female co-worker, we
should be concerned that feminism is being used in the service of
Fordism. 4
7
Feminists should aspire to do much more. We should aspire to
create a world in which people do not have to suspend our basic
humanity while we are at work. We should aspire to create a world
in which women as well as men, sexual minorities as well as those
in the sexual mainstream, can be perceived as sexual beings and
competent workers at the same time - a world where sexuality,
humanity, and authority coexist for all. To do this, we must create
workplaces in which women as well as men, people from all walks
of life, occupy the structural positions of equality and authority that
are necessary to endow us with us with the capacity to engage in
free and equal expression - including sexual expression.
I could say more about how my approach to harassment gets us
closer to these goals. The basic idea is to create a body of law that
gives companies the incentive to fully integrate their workplaces
along sex/gender lines, but does not spur them to censor benign
sexual expression in the name of protecting women from sexual
harassment. But I'm out of time.
46 Miller Brewing Company was assessed $26.6 million in damages after the
company fired a male executive whom a female employee had accused of sexual
harassment. See James L. Graff, It Was a Joke! An Alleged Sexual Harasser Is
Deemed the Real Victim, TIME, July 28, 1997, at 62. The executive had related
to the employee an episode of Seinfeld in which Seinfeld cannot remember the
name of the woman he is dating, but he knows it rhymes with a part of the
female anatomy. Id. When the employee did not get the joke, the executive
photocopied a dictionary page defining "clitoris" and handed it to her. Id.
47 Stone, The New Psychological Contract, supra note 43, at 9-11
(describing Fordism's impulse to rationalize and standardize the organization of
work).
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